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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the impact of competing opinion leaders on attracting followers in a social group 
based on a bounded confidence model in terms of four characteristics: reputation, stubbornness, 
appeal and extremeness. In the model, reputation differs among leaders and normal agents based on 
the weights assigned to them, stubbornness of leaders is reflected by their confidence towards normal 
agents, appeal of the leaders is represented by the confidence of followers towards them, and 
extremeness is captured by the opinion values of leaders. Simulations show that increasing reputation, 
stubbornness or extremeness make it more difficult for the group to achieve consensus, but 
increasing the appeal will make it easier. The results demonstrate that successful opinion leaders 
should generally be less stubborn, have greater appeal and be less extreme in order to attract more 
followers in a competing environment. Furthermore, the number of followers can be very sensitive to 
small changes in these characteristics. On the other hand, reputation has a more complicated impact: 
higher reputation helps the leader to attract more followers when the group bound of confidence is 
high, but can hinder the leader from attracting followers when the group bound of confidence is low. 
Keywords: Opinion dynamics; Social networks; Bounded confidence model; Opinion leader; 
Characteristics 
1. Introduction 
Opinion dynamics in a group of interacting agents (individuals) has been studied for a long time 
from a wide range of perspectives, e.g., sociology, physics, politics, economics and philosophy 1-6. In 
these models of opinion dynamics, a group of agents who hold beliefs and opinions about a given 
topic interact with each other to seek truth or reach consensus 7. In many real situations, there are 
some agents, called opinion leaders, in a society who have more power on influencing the other 
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agents’ opinions because of their expertise or positions 8-10. In some cases, there are usually two or 
more (groups of) opinion leaders holding competing opinions, e.g., political parties in elections, 
experts in scientific research, opinion leaders in science and religion 11, 12. In a society with 
competing opinion leaders, questions such as, under what circumstances a) agents follow one of the 
opinion leaders but reject the other, b) opinion followers switch from following one leader to another, 
c) a sub-group of agents emerge that do not follow any opinion leader, immediately suggest 
themselves.  
The original definition of opinion leaders in social opinion dynamics was provided by Katz and 
Lazarsfeld 13 as “the individuals who were likely to influence other persons in their immediate 
environment.” Although intuitively clear, this definition does not provide a specific mechanism 
through which the opinion leaders influence the others. The well-known two-step flow model 
described a process of the information influence “flowing” from the media through opinion leaders 
to their respective followers 14, where the mechanics of the process itself remain unspecified. Based 
on the two-step flow model, using different opinion update rules, a significant number of opinion 
dynamics models have been built to analyse the function of opinion leaders in the context of party 
elections, marketing, and diffusion of innovations 8, 13, 15.  
Despite the merits of these models, it is worth considering in more detail how to model the 
mechanism and measure the power of opinion leaders to influence their followers. In reality, the 
ways opinion leaders utilize their powers to affect the opinions of others are quite diverse due to 
different scenarios, their personalities and backgrounds 1, 16. It is hardly possible to consider all of the 
real characteristics in one mathematical model, but key characteristics can be included. Kurmysheve 
and Juárez 17 suggested reputation as a key characteristic reflecting the power of opinion leaders, 
which is usually realized through higher weights assigned to leaders. Interestingly, however, Douven 
and Riegler 18 reported that applying higher reputation to some elite agents does not produce a 
discernible difference compared to the situation where all the agents are equally weighted. It was 
also suggested 17 that opinion leaders should maintain invariable opinions in the process of opinion 
dynamics, which is sometimes called stubbornness 19, 20. More recently, Zhao and Kou 21 proposed 
an opinion leader-follower model which divides the whole group into two sub-groups, i.e., a leader 
sub-group and a follower sub-group, and the information / influence transition is based on the 
principle of a two-step flow model where the opinion update is based on a bounded confidence 
model, the Hegselmann-Krause (HK) model 22, 23. Their results showed that the opinion followers are 
strongly influenced by the leaders if they have higher confidence levels and trust degrees in the 
leaders. The trust degree introduced in their model is defined by the weights of leaders, and so is 
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actually a kind of reputation, while the higher confidence levels of followers towards opinion leaders 
can be thought of as the appeal of the opinion leaders.  
Most of the existing models on opinion dynamics with opinion leaders discuss only one leader 
or a sub-group of opinion leaders who normally achieve consensus, while the phenomenon that two 
or more (groups of) opinion leaders hold competing opinions in a social group is very common in 
reality 11, 12, and therefore it is important to explore how competing opinion leaders can attract more 
followers. For potentially competing opinion leaders, their opinions usually go in polarized 
directions due to the competing environment 24. Therefore, the opinion extremeness should also be 
considered as an important characteristic of opinion leaders, especially in a competing environment. 
Summing up, we conclude that the influential power of competing opinion leaders on their followers 
in a social group can be measured by four characteristics: reputation, stubbornness, appeal and 
extremeness. However, there are few studies that have analysed the impact of such characteristics on 
opinion dynamics in a social group with competing opinion leaders systematically, and therefore this 
will be the focus of the current paper.  
As for opinion update mechanisms, there are generally two types of opinion dynamics models: 
continuous opinion dynamics and discrete opinion dynamics 5, 6. In continuous opinion dynamics 
models, the opinion is usually modelled as a real variable in the interval [0, 1], and the agents 
interact with each other to update their opinions. The bounded confidence model is a representative 
continuous opinion dynamics model, where agents only interact with neighbours whose opinions are 
similar to theirs, and the similarity is decided by the bound of confidence or tolerance 25. Among 
these models, the Deffuant-Weisbuch (DW) model and HK model have recently received 
considerable attention 26-33. It has already been well established that these models have consensus 
thresholds for the bound of confidence, above which a consensus in the group is always achieved 
while the whole group may split into two or more non-interacting sub-groups with the same opinion 
in each of them when below the consensus thresholds 5. Furthermore, several interesting 
modifications or extensions to these models have been introduced recently. Some of the 
modifications introduce heterogeneous bounded confidence such that the assumption that all 
individuals in a given society have the same level of confidence is no longer necessary 32. The impact 
of external factors, e.g., mass media, on dynamics of opinions in real societies have also been 
analysed recently 34, 35. In this paper we adopt the HK model as the basic opinion update mechanism 
for the group opinion dynamics with competing opinion leaders, and use it to investigate the impact 
of the four characteristics of opinion leaders identified above. 
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2. The HK model with opinion leaders 
The HK model is based on a complete network consisting of n vertices, representing agents, i.e., all 
the agents are linked to each other. Each agent holds an opinion about a given topic. The opinion xi(t) 
that agent i has at time-step t is a real variable in the interval [0, 1], and it may change along a set of 
discrete time points according to the given update mechanism. We adopt the extended HK model 
proposed in 18 as the basic opinion update mechanism, which is  
 
1
( , )
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    .                                        (1) 
( , ) { : ( ) ( ) }i j iI i t j x t x t     are epistemic neighbourhoods 
23 of agent i at time t, and the parameters 
i  is the bound of confidence in opinion. Here the weight rj > 0 represents the reputation that is 
assigned to agent j, and the function 
( , )
( , ) jj I i tg i t r  sums the reputations of agents in I(i, t).  
Since the original HK model does not consider opinion leaders, we need to incorporate their 
characteristics into the model in order to study their impact on the opinion dynamics. Suppose that 
there are two opinion leaders in a social group, who usually hold opposite opinions about a topic and 
are denoted as L1 and L2. The opinion leaders are assigned larger weights compared to normal agents 
to reflect their reputation. The reputations of opinion leaders Li are denoted as Ri (i = 1, 2) and they 
are usually larger than r, the weight of normal agents which will always be 1. The stubbornness of 
opinion leaders is reflected by their small bounds of confidence, denoted as Si (i=1, 2), so that they 
can influence the other agents but are not, or are less, influenced by them. We define the 
stubbornness of opinion leaders as 1
ii L
S T   (i=1, 2), where 
iL
T  denotes the bound of confidence of 
leader Li. On the other hand, the normal agents should have larger bounds of confidence towards the 
leaders than that towards their peers (denoted as T), which are denoted as Ai (i = 1, 2), reflecting the 
appeal of opinion leaders to the normal agents. Finally, the extremeness of opinion leaders is 
reflected by how close they are to the extreme values, 0 and 1, of the opinion interval, and it is 
defined as 2 0.5
ii L
E x    (i=1, 2), where 
iL
x  is the opinion value of leader Li. Note that 
extremeness itself cannot make an agent an opinion leader, and so we do not investigate its impact by 
itself but the combined effect with the other characteristics. 
Since we are mainly interested in how the opinion leaders compete to attract followers, we adopt 
the average number of stationary sub-groups of normal agents (i.e., we exclude groups consisting of 
only opinion leaders), and the average number of followers of the opinion leaders as the quantities to 
study the impact of these four characteristics. There are different ways to define what it means for an 
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agent to be a follower of a given opinion leader. One might define followers as the agents with the 
same opinion as the leader in the post transient regime. This definition seems too strict, however, 
because some agents may have a similar, but not exactly the same, opinion as the leader and their 
opinions may become identical to that of the leader if some conditions changed slightly. Therefore, a 
more reasonable approach is to define opinion followers as the agents whose opinions are within a 
certain range of the opinion of some opinion leader. Concretely, if one and only one opinion leader is 
within the epistemic range, as defined in equation (1), of one agent when stability is achieved, then 
this agent is called an opinion follower of that leader. If the two leaders are both within the epistemic 
range of an agent, then the agent is being influenced by both leaders and cannot be called a follower 
of either leader. 
3. Simulation results and discussion 
We consider a society with two competing opinion leaders and investigate the impact of the four 
characteristics one by one. In addition, these two opinion leaders do not interact with each other due 
to the nature of competition, i.e., they are completely stubborn towards each other. Before going into 
the detail of the simulations, we briefly discuss the real world interpretations of some parameter 
settings. 
Number of agents – It is possible for a real world network to have a very low number of agents 
or a large number of agents. In the performed simulations, the number of agents is chosen as 200, 
and two of the agents are designated opinion leaders based on the specifically assigned opinions as 
described in the following paragraph. We have implemented the simulations on the network with up 
to 1000 agents and found that there was no significant difference in the results compared to the 
network with 200 agents. 
Initial opinion values are generated randomly on the interval [0, 1] (uniformly distributed) for 
each agent, while that of the opinion leaders are set to some specific values, i.e., a smaller value of 
0.2 for leader L1 and a symmetric larger value of 0.8 for leader L2 when exploring the impact of 
reputation, stubbornness and appeal. The symmetry in leaders’ opinions helps to see clearly the 
impact of these three characteristics. We also vary the opinion of leader L1 from 0 to 0.5 and leader 
L2 from 1 to 0.5 when investigating the impact of extremeness. It is worth mentioning that when 
testing the impact of the four characteristics of opinion leaders, we use the same initial opinions and 
apply different values to the parameters corresponding to these characteristics. 
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Repeated runs – Given the fact that the initial opinions are generated randomly, simulations 
might show variant results even with the same parameter settings. For this reason, we have 
implemented 200 and 500 runs with all the other conditions being the same, and found that 200 runs 
were sufficient to obtain reasonable results.  
3.1. Impact of reputation on opinion dynamics 
As stated previously, it has been reported that reputation does not produce a discernible difference in 
agent dynamics by applying higher weights to some elite agents compared with the situation where 
all the agents are equally weighted 18. We therefore let the reputation of opinion leaders Ri vary in a 
wider range, from 1 to 400 in steps of 10, to see its impact, while keeping the values of other 
characteristics the same as that of the normal agents except for the starting initial opinion values. 
That is we set 
iL i
T A T  , Ei = 0.6, where T is the bounds of confidence of normal agents. 
First we investigate the average number of stationary sub-groups of normal agents with the 
reputations of both opinion leaders varying simultaneously from 1 to 400 in steps of 10 while the 
group bound of confidence T takes values from 0.05 to 0.5 in steps of 0.01. First of all, as has been 
studied in the literature, Fig. 1 (a) shows that increasing the group bound of confidence will make the 
agents more likely to achieve consensus. As for the impact of reputation, Fig. 1 (a) demonstrates that 
increasing reputation will slightly increase the number of sub-groups, i.e., make it harder for the 
agents to achieve consensus, when the group bound of confidence (0.15,0.3)T  . For most values of 
T, this effect is significant only when the reputation is smaller than 50, as is further shown in Fig. 1 
(b), while there is little effect in terms of the number of sub-groups by further increasing the 
reputation, which confirms the findings in 18. However, even small changes might be significant in 
certain respects. For example, the figures also show the change of consensus threshold from 0.25 
when there is no opinion leader (Ri=1) to around 0.32 when the leaders have a higher reputation 
Ri=50 (i = 1, 2). The reason for this is that when is the opinion leaders have a sufficiently high 
reputation, e.g., 50, their neighbours converge to them more quickly because of the higher reputation 
and the others that fall outside their epistemic range will have less chance to be influenced by them 
either directly or indirectly via their neighbours. However, when the group bound of confidence is 
larger than 0.32 as shown in the figures, there will be an overlap between the epistemic ranges of the 
two leaders, which makes the leaders affect each other via their common neighbours and makes the 
group achieve consensus.  
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(a)      (b) 
Fig. 1. Average number of sub-groups with respect to (a) group bound of confidence T with different reputation values, 
and (b) reputation Ri with different bounds of confidence, where Si =1-T, Ai = T, Ei = 0.6. Averages taken over 200 runs. 
In order to see the impact of reputation for the two opinion leaders on attracting followers, we 
then explore the average number of followers of the two opinion leaders as shown in Fig. 2 by fixing 
the reputation of opinion leader L2 to, R2 =50, and varying the reputation of leader L1 from 1 to 400 
in steps of 5, while keeping the values of other characteristics the same as in the above simulations. 
We have also investigated the case where R2 =100, and the simulation results show a similar pattern.  
When the group bound of confidence T is 0.2 as shown in Fig. 2 (a), increasing the reputation of 
leader L1 actually decreases the number of his followers while increasing the number of followers of 
leader L2. The two leaders are always attracting the same number of followers when T = 0.3 as 
shown in Fig. 2 (b), but increasing the reputation of leader L1 increases the number of followers of 
both leaders dramatically until R1 = R2 = 50 and thereafter all the agents are divided equally into two 
groups of followers of the two leaders. When T = 0.35 as shown in Fig. 2 (c), neither leader can 
attract any followers when R1 < 100, and when R1 increases from 100 to 230, the number of 
followers of both leaders increases quickly, but leader L1, who has higher reputation, is able to gain 
more followers now. The state that neither leader can attract any follower lasts longer when T = 0.4 
as shown in Fig. 2 (d) until R1 = 300 and thereafter both leaders start to attract a few followers with 
increasing reputation of leader L1.  
The counterintuitive result that higher reputation results in fewer followers in some cases can be 
explained by reasoning along the lines stated earlier. The opinion leader with higher reputation is 
able to persuade their epistemic neighbours converge to them more quickly and the others that fall 
outside their epistemic range will have less chance to be influenced by them either directly or 
indirectly. On the other hand, the leader with lower reputation can work with their epistemic 
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neighbours and persuade the agents that were outside of their epistemic range to follow them via 
their common neighbours although the process may take a bit longer. As a result, when the group 
bound of confidence T takes a smaller value as shown in Fig. 2 (a), the opinion leader with higher 
reputation can only influence the agents in a narrow range and gain less followers. However, when T 
becomes larger as shown in Fig. 2 (b), the leader with higher reputation is able to influence a wider 
range of agents, which overcomes the previous negative impact of reputation gradually. When T is 
larger still as shown in Fig. 2 (c) and (d), all of the normal agents are able to be influenced by both 
leaders and will normally achieve consensus, and only when one leader has a much higher reputation 
than the other can this enable that leader to attract more followers. The consensus can be achieved 
because of the emergence of an intermediate group that brings the two opinion leaders and their 
followers together. However, for higher reputations this intermediate group can instead be 
incorporated into the followers of the opinion leader with the highest reputation.  
 
(a)      (b) 
 
(c)      (d) 
Fig. 2. Average number of followers of opinion leaders L1 and L2 with respect to reputation of leader L1, where R2 =50, Si 
= 1-T, Ai = T, Ei = 0.6 and group bound of confidence T is (a) 0.2, (b) 0.3, (c) 0.35 and (d) 0.4. Averages taken over 200 
runs. 
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3.2. Impact of stubbornness on opinion dynamics 
To study the impact of the stubbornness of opinion leaders on the group opinion dynamics, taking a 
similar strategy as when investigating the impact of reputation, we first let Ai = T, Ri = 1, and Si vary 
simultaneously from 0.8 to 1 in steps of 0.01 (the corresponding bounds of confidence for the 
opinion leaders 
iL
T  change from 0.2 to 0) while the group bound of confidence T takes values from 
0.05 to 0.5 in steps of 0.01, and explore the average number of sub-groups of the normal agents. The 
simulation results are shown in Fig. 3.  
 
(a)      (b) 
Fig. 3. Average number of groups with respect to (a) group bound of confidence T with different stubbornness values, 
and (b) stubbornness Si with different bounds of confidence, where Ri =1, Ai = T, Ei = 0.6. Averages taken over 200 runs. 
Overall, the simulation results in Fig. 3 show that stubbornness has little effect on the group 
opinion dynamics in terms of average number of sub-groups. Increasing stubbornness of the leaders 
results in a slight increase in the number of sub-groups only when the group bound of confidence T is 
around 0.1 as shown in Fig. 3 (a). Fig. 3 (b) also illustrates that the average number of groups is 
almost independent of stubbornness and only when the stubbornness increases from 0.95 to 0.96 at T 
= 0.25, does the average number of sub-groups become slightly larger. For example, where the same 
number of sub-groups are formed under different stubbornness degrees, it takes a longer time (about 
60 to 100 times longer) for the agents to reach stationary state if the leaders are completely stubborn 
than if the stubbornness is 0.9. 
In order to see the impact of stubbornness of opinion leaders on attracting followers, we 
similarly explore the average number of followers of the two opinion leaders by letting opinion 
leader L2 be S2 = 0.95 and varying the stubbornness degree of leader L1 from 0.8 to 1 in steps of 0.01. 
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 4. 
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(a)      (b) 
 
(c)      (d) 
Fig. 4. Average number of followers of opinion leaders L1 and L2 with respect to stubbornness of leader L1, where Ri =1, 
S2=0.95, Ai = T, Ei = 0.6 and group bound of confidence T is (a) 0.2, (b) 0.25, (c) 0.3 and (d) 0.35. Averages taken over 
200 runs. 
The figures when the group bound of confidence is smaller than 0.2 are not shown here since the 
normal agents would be more stubborn than the leaders at some points. It can be seen from Fig. 4 
that the less stubborn leader is usually able to attract more followers, and the impact is more 
significant when the group bound of confidence T = 0.25 and 0.3 as shown in Fig. 4 (b) and (c). 
When T = 0.25, the number of followers of leader L1 decreases dramatically from 100 to around 20 
while that of leader L2 increases from 20 to around 80 when the stubbornness of leader L1 increases 
from 0.92 to 0.98. When T = 0.3, the number of followers of leader L2 increases dramatically from 0 
to 100 while that of leader L1 keeps around 80 when the stubbornness of leader L1 increases from 
0.92 to 0.96. The transition between having more followers and fewer followers occurs at S1 = 0.95 
since that is the point where S1 = S2. The reason that lower stubbornness leads to more followers in 
general is that a less stubborn leader is more likely to learn the opinions of the normal agents by 
changing his opinion to be closer to theirs, and when the group bound of confidence is at certain 
range, e.g., 0.25 or 0.3, which is in the region of the consensus threshold when the leaders are 
11 
 
equally stubborn as shown in Fig. 3 (a), the less stubborn leader is able to affect a sufficient range of 
agents and attract them as followers. When the group bound of confidence becomes larger than 0.35 
as in Fig. 4 (d), both the leaders cannot attract followers anymore because all the normal agents are 
influenced by both the leaders (directly or indirectly) and this normally results in a consensus at the 
average opinion of the leaders. We have also carried out the simulations with Ai = T and Ri = 50 and 
found that stubbornness has no discernible impact on attracting followers for the two leaders. The 
reason is that higher reputation of leaders makes their epistemic neighbours converge to them more 
quickly as stated in the previous section and the effect of stubbornness becomes irrelevant as a 
consequence since the opinions of the leaders do not change much even for low values of 
stubbornness. 
We let the leaders to be completely stubborn, i.e., Si = 1 when investigating the impact of appeal 
and extremeness in the following sections, because it helps to see their impact more clearly by fixing 
the leaders’ opinions. For consistency, we also fix the reputation of opinion leaders to be Ri = 50, as 
it has been shown in Fig. 1 that much higher reputations makes little difference.  
3.3. Impact of appeal on opinion dynamics 
This section shows the impact of the appeal of opinion leaders on group opinion dynamics and 
attracting followers. With a similar strategy as before, we first investigate the average number of 
sub-groups of the normal agents by letting the appeal of both the leaders vary simultaneously from 
0.25 to 0.5 in steps of 0.01 and the group bound of confidence T from 0.05 to 0.5 in steps of 0.01, 
while Ri = 50 and Si = 1 (i = 1, 2). The simulation results are shown in Fig. 5.  
The results in Fig. 5 show that increasing the appeal of both the leaders makes it easier for the 
normal agents to achieve consensus (i.e. it lowers the consensus threshold), which confirms the 
findings in 21, because they are more likely to be influenced by both leaders which makes them 
achieve consensus roughly at the average opinion of the leaders. There is a common pattern for most 
of the appeal values in Fig. 5 (a): with increasing group bound of confidence, the average number of 
sub-groups keeps stable at two or three at first, and rises to a peak with less than one additional sub-
group on average, and then falls back to one normally (i.e., the agents achieve consensus). When the 
appeal of leaders is 0.3 as shown in Fig. 5 (a), the normal agents will usually be divided into two 
groups following the corresponding leaders. When the appeal is larger than 0.3 and the group 
confidence is low, the normal agents whose original opinions are around 0.5 are affected by both the 
leaders and will normally achieve consensus in the middle, but those who are far from the middle can 
only be affected by one of the leaders and become their followers resulting in three sub-groups in 
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total. It is also shown in Fig. 5 (b) that, for several cases, the number of sub-groups changes from 
about three to two, when the appeal increase from 0.25 to 0.3, but back to three again with larger 
appeal. When the group bound of confidence T is 0.25, the number of sub-groups stays at 2 until the 
appeal is around 0.38 at which point it rises to the peak of four and gradually back to one again. This 
is because 0.3 is the distance between the middle of opinion interval and the opinions of the two 
leaders. When the leaders’ appeal is between 0.25 and 0.3, the leaders can only attract the nearby 
normal agents quickly to become their followers because of their higher reputation, while the agents 
around the middle will not be affected by them.  
 
(a)      (b) 
Fig. 5. Average number of groups with respect to (a) group bound of confidence T with different appeal values, and (b) 
appeal Ai with different group bounds of confidence where Ri = 50, Si = 1, Ei = 0.6. Averages taken over 200 runs. 
We can then investigate the impact of appeal on attracting followers for the leaders via the 
average number of followers of the opinion leaders, by fixing the appeal of opinion leader L2 to be A2 
= 0.4, and varying that of leader L1 from 0.2 to 0.5 in steps of 0.05, while Ri = 50 and Si = 1 (i = 1, 2). 
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 6.  
The results in Fig. 6 overall demonstrate that appeal plays a straightforward role for opinion 
leaders, i.e., increasing appeal normally helps the leader to attract more followers or lower the 
number of followers of the opposite leader. The reason is that the leader with higher appeal is 
normally able to affect a wider range of agents. However, if the group bound of confidence is large 
enough as shown in Fig. 6 (b) and (c), increasing the appeal will make more normal agents be 
influenced by both leaders and achieve consensus by themselves, and therefore reduce the number of 
followers of both leaders, especially in the sensitive appeal interval (0.35, 0.45) where the number of 
followers of leader L2 decreases dramatically. When the group bound of confidence becomes larger 
still as shown in Fig. 6 (d), all the agents will be affected by both leaders and achieve consensus at 
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the average opinion when the appeal of leader L1 is greater than 0.4, and so neither leader can attract 
followers anymore. However, when the appeal of L1 is smaller than 0.35, leader L2 attracts all the 
normal agents as followers. This dramatic change in support for leader L2 as the appeal of leader 
changes L1 from 0.35 to 0.4 can be explained as follows. When the appeal of L1 is smaller than that 
of leader L2, A2 = 0.4, and the group bound of confidence T = 0.4, the normal agents with opinions 
smaller than 0.4 will be pulled to the middle of the opinion interval at first due to the effect of both 
leaders (indirectly in the case of L2) and other normal agents, but then further pulled up by L2 and 
other normal agents, and become followers of L2 subsequently.  
 
(a)      (b) 
 
(c)      (d) 
Fig. 6. Average number of followers of opinion leaders L1 and L2 with respect to appeal of leader L1, where Ri =50, Si=1, 
A2 = 0.4, Ei = 0.6 and group bound of confidence T is (a) 0.25, (b) 0.3, (c) 0.35, and (d) 0.4. Averages taken over 200 
runs. 
3.4. Impact of extremeness on opinion dynamics 
Similarly, we first investigate the average number of sub-groups of the normal agents by letting the 
opinion of leader L2 change from 0.5 to 1 and that of leader L1 vary symmetrically from 0.5 to 0 in 
steps of (±)0.025, which means that the extremeness of both leaders Ei vary simultaneously from 0 to 
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1 in steps of 0.05, and the group bound of confidence T vary from 0.05 to 0.5 in steps of 0.01, while 
Ri =50, Si =1, and Ai = 0.4 (i = 1, 2).  
 
(a)      (b) 
Fig. 7. Average number of groups with respect to (a) group bound of confidence T with different extremeness values, and 
(b) extremeness Ei with different group bounds of confidence where Ri = 50, Si = 1, Ai = 0.4. Averages taken over 200 
runs. 
Overall the results in Fig. 7 show that in most cases it is easier for normal agents to achieve 
consensus when the leaders are less extreme. The reason is that, when the two leaders are moving 
simultaneously from the completely extreme opinions, 0 and 1, to the middle of the opinion interval, 
more normal agents will be affected by both of them and are more likely to form consensus. Apart 
from the overall effect, some critical extremeness values are worth discussing due to their interesting 
behaviour. When the extremeness is 0.2 as in Fig. 7 (a), i.e., opinion of leader L1 is 0.4 and that of 
leader L2 is 0.6, all the normal agents can be influenced by both leaders sooner or later given the fact 
that the appeal of the leaders is 0.4, and so the normal agents can always achieve consensus. When 
the extremeness is 0.8, i.e., opinion of leader L1 is 0.1 and that of leader L2 is 0.9, the normal agents 
will usually be divided into two sub-groups of followers of the leaders.  
In order to investigate the impact of extremeness on attracting followers, we explore the average 
number of followers of the two opinion leaders by varying the extremeness of leader L1 from 0 to 1 
in steps of 0.05, and fix that of leader L2 to be 0.6, i.e., E2 = 0.6. The following figures show the 
simulation results for the average numbers of followers of opinion leaders L1 and L2 with respect to 
different group confidence levels where Ri =50, Si =1, and Ai = 0.4 (i = 1, 2). 
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 (a)      (b) 
 
(c)      (d) 
Fig. 8. Average number of followers of opinion leaders L1 and L2 with respect to extremeness of opinion leader L1, where 
Ri =50, Si =1, Ai =0.4, E2 =0.6 and group bound of confidence T being (a) 0.2, (b) 0.25, (c) 0.35 and (d) 0.4. Averages 
taken over 200 runs. 
Clearly, the extremeness of leader L1 being 0.6 is a point where the numbers of followers of the 
two leaders are always the same since they have the same value for all four characteristics. When the 
extremeness of the two leaders differs, we can conclude from the above figures that the less extreme 
opinion leader is generally more capable of attracting followers. It is also shown that there are some 
critical extremeness values so that neither leader can attract any follower if E1 is smaller than the 
critical value, but there will be dramatic increase in the number of followers of both leaders if E1 
becomes larger than the critical value, e.g., E1 = 0.4 when T = 0.25 as in Fig. 8 (b), and E1 = 0.6 
when T = 0.4 as in Fig. 8 (d). This is because more agents will be able to be affected by both leaders 
indirectly with a larger group bound of confidence provided the opinion leaders are not too extreme 
and then they will normally achieve consensus by themselves and are not treated as the followers of 
any leader according to the definition. Only when the leaders are more extreme as stated above, do 
they depart from this state and the normal agents are broken from consensus into two sub-groups of 
followers.  
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4. Conclusions 
This paper has introduced opinion leaders holding competing opinions, and analysed the impact of 
four characteristics of the opinion leaders – reputation, stubbornness, appeal and extremeness – on 
the group opinion dynamics and the ability of the opinion leaders to attract followers. It has been 
shown that increasing the reputation of opinion leaders may make it more difficult for the normal 
agents to achieve consensus, and the leader with higher reputation will make the neighbours 
converge to his opinion more quickly, and so attract more followers, when the group bound of 
confidence is larger, but fewer followers when the group bound of confidence is smaller. 
Stubbornness has no discernible effect on the number of sub-groups, but less stubborn leaders are 
usually able to attract more followers. On the other hand, increasing appeal of opinion leaders makes 
it easier for the normal agents to achieve consensus. It normally makes more agents begin to follow 
the opinion leader more quickly if a higher appeal is applied to that leader. The simulation results 
also demonstrate that increasing extremeness makes it more difficult for the agents to achieve 
consensus, and a less extreme opinion leader is usually able to attract more followers. While the 
general dependence on stubbornness, appeal and extremeness might be expected, the number of 
followers attracted by the opinion leaders can be very sensitive to these characteristics of the 
respective leaders. For example, in some cases a leader who is only slightly less (more) stubborn 
than the competing leader can attract a lot more (less) followers. 
Note that since there are four characteristics for the two competing opinion leaders under 
discussion, it is impossible to explore the complete parameter space in one paper. As a result, we 
usually fix the values of other characteristics when investigating the impact of one of the 
characteristics. On the other hand, opinion leaders could of course try to strengthen one aspect when 
they are weak in the other aspect, and there will be compensation among different characteristics on 
their impact on group opinion dynamics. For instance, the opinion leader who does not have higher 
reputation but does have stronger appeal compared to the other leader might also be able to attract 
more followers. We leave this kind of compensation among different characteristics for future work. 
Note also that the values of the four characteristics are invariant during the opinion update process in 
this paper, but in reality the opinion leaders might change their strategies with respect to the four 
characteristics at certain stages in order to attract more followers. We are exploring some models 
with dynamic parameter settings to investigate this case.  
It is also worth mentioning that the impact of external information, e.g., mass media 35, is not 
explicitly considered in our model, because it can be treated as a completely stubborn opinion leader. 
17 
 
Higher connectivity is also considered as a characteristic of opinion leaders in some papers 25, but as 
suggested in 17, it might not be an intrinsic feature of a leader but a topological property of the 
network reflecting a social position of the hub. We will discuss the impact of connectivity or 
different network structures relating to opinion leaders in future work. Although it seems out of 
control of opinion leaders, the group bound of confidence is definitely an important characteristic 
affecting group opinion dynamics, as it determines to what extent normal agents are  ‘open-minded’ 
towards their peers. It has been shown in this paper that there is usually a tradeoff between the group 
bound of confidence and the four characteristics, and it is worth further exploring this relationship in 
future work. 
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